On 19 November 2025, the Financial Intelligence Agency (AIF), in cooperation with UK Technical Assistance Unit , experts from the United Kingdom’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI), organised a training session on the implementation of international sanctions related to counter-terrorism financing and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The training brought together representatives of state institutions and the private sector involved in the implementation of these sanctions, with the aim of further strengthening capacities for the effective enforcement of obligations concerning the designation of individuals as terrorist financiers, in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373. The session also highlighted the essential role of inter-institutional coordination and the exchange of information provided by responsible authorities.
During the training, participants were also introduced to the experience of the banking sector in Albania regarding the implementation of obligations for the “without delay” freezing of funds and other assets belonging to individuals designated as terrorist financiers at the international level. The presentations emphasised the crucial role of transaction-monitoring systems, continuous screening of designated persons, internal institutional procedures and effectiveness indicators, as well as the importance of cooperation between financial institutions and the Financial Intelligence Agency in the reporting, blocking, and subsequent seizure of identified funds and assets.
The topics presented highlighted the growing importance of cooperation between state institutions and the private sector to improve the effective implementation of financial sanctions against terrorist financing and WMD proliferation. This cooperation relies on continuous communication and information sharing among competent authorities, financial institutions, and designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs). The activity also presented several international best practices for enhancing the effectiveness of public-private partnerships, the roles and responsibilities of both sectors in sanctions implementation, the effective use of beneficial ownership registers, challenges faced by the private sector in meeting legal compliance obligations, and the need to develop technological tools and solutions that support monitoring, detection, and reporting processes for business relationships or transactions involving sanctioned individuals or entities, either internationally or domestically.
Participants were further informed about key findings from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) report on “Complex Schemes of WMD Proliferation Financing and Sanctions Evasion,” which identifies the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran as the most significant actors in current WMD proliferation financing. This is due to the diversity of revenue-generating activities (including cyber-attacks) and the globalised nature of financial systems. The presentations highlighted risks related to:
• Concealment of beneficial ownership information: through complex corporate structures, shell companies, and stolen identities used to obscure the real actors.
• Use of virtual assets and new technologies: including cyber-enabled virtual asset crime, mixing services to avoid traceability, and decentralised online financial transactions and relationships.
• Exploitation of the maritime sector: through vessel identity manipulation, ship-to-ship transfers, and evasion techniques designed to hide the movement of dual-use or sanctioned goods.
• Use of intermediaries: involving shell companies, transit services, and correspondent banking relationships to obscure transaction chains and financial flows.
OFSI experts presented a series of recommendations aimed at further strengthening institutional capacities and increasing the effectiveness of sanctions implementation in the Republic of Albania. At the conclusion of the training, the importance of Albania’s technical compliance and effectiveness with international standards was underlined, given that both state and non-state actors continue to exploit weaknesses in counter-terrorist financing and WMD-proliferation controls.