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- Njoftimi i Këshillit të Sigurimit të Kombeve të Bashkuara 28.09.2022 SC/15040 27 September 2022-“SHTESË”Security Council 2140 Sanctions Committee Adds Two Entries to Its Sanctions List – SC/15040 – 27 September 2022 On 26 September 2022, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) approved the addition of the entries specified below to its Sanctions List of individuals and entities subject to the measures imposed by the Security Council and adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Individuals YEi.010 Name: 1: MANSUR 2: AL-SA’ADI Name (original script): منصور السعادي Title: n/a Designation: Major General, Houthi Commander of Yemen’s Naval and Coastal Defense Forces DOB: 1988 POB: Yemen Good quality a.k.a.: n/a Low quality a.k.a.: a) Mansoor Ahmed Al Saadi b) Mansur Ahmad al-Sa’adi c) Abu Sajjad Nationality: Yemen Passport no: n/a National identification no: n/a Address: Yemen Listed on: 26 Sep. 2022 Other information: Houthi Naval Forces Chief of Staff, who has masterminded lethal attacks against international shipping in the Red Sea, plays a leading role in Houthi naval efforts that directly threaten the peace, security, and stability of Yemen. Physical Description: Eye Color: Brown; Hair: Brown. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/View-UN-Notices-Individual. YEi.011 Name: 1: MOTLAQ 2: AMER 3: AL-MARRANI Name (original script): مطلق عامر المراني Title: n/a Designation: (Former) Deputy Head of the Houthi National Security Bureau (NSB) (intelligence agency) DOB: 1 Jan 1984 POB: Al-Jawf, Yemen Good quality a.k.a.: a) Mutlaq Ali Aamer Al Marrani b) Abu Emad Low quality a.k.a.: n/a Nationality: Yemen Passport no: n/a National identification no: n/a Address: Yemen Listed on: 26 Sep. 2022 Other information: Former Deputy Head of the Houthi National Security Bureau (NSB), oversaw detainees of the NSB who were subjected to torture and other mistreatment while detained, planned and directed illegal arrests and detention of humanitarian workers and the unlawful diversion of humanitarian assistance in violation of international humanitarian law. Physical Description: Eye Color: Brown; Hair: Brown. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/View-UN-Notices-Individual. Press releases concerning changes to the Committee’s Sanctions List may be found in the “Press Releases” section on the Committee’s website at the following URL: www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2140/press-releases. The updated version of the Committee’s Sanctions List, available in HTML, PDF and XML format, may be found at the following URL: www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2140/materials. The United Nations Security Council Consolidated List is also updated following all changes made to the Committee’s Sanctions List and is accessible at the following URL: www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/un-sc-consolidated-list. Listën e përditësuar të OKB e gjeni në adresat e mëposhtme si dhe në modulin e raportimit të DPPPP. Listën e përditësuar, të plotë, të përcaktuar sipas individëve, subjekteve, vendeve dhe rezolutave bazë, e gjeni në: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/un-sc-consolidated-list (Lista e Konsoliduar e OKB për personal dhe subjektet e shpallura Terrorist); https://www.un.org/press/en/content/security-council/press-release (Lista e Konsoliduar e OKB për personal dhe subjektet e shpallura Terrorist në faqen web të DPPPP https://fiu.gov.al/sq/ ... Më shumë ...
- Njoftimi i Këshillit të Sigurimit të Kombeve të Bashkuara 17.09.2022 SC/15029 14 September 2022-“AZHURNIM”Security Council 1718 Sanctions Committee Amends Two Entries on Its Sanctions List – SC/15029 – 14 September 2022 Përshëndetje, Bashkëlidhur do të gjeni përditësimin e listës Datë 14/09/2022, së 2 subjekteve të shpallur nga Këshilli i Sigurimi të OKB, në përditësimin e radhës që konsiston në, “AZHURNIM” të informacioneve të 2 (dy) subjekteve ekzistues ne liste KSOKB (SC/15029 14 SEPTEMBER 2022) Ky ndryshim në listën e sanksioneve bëhet sipas Vendimit të rezolutës (SC/15029 14/09/2022) ( https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc15029.doc.htm ) Security Council 1718 Sanctions Committee Amends Two Entries on Its Sanctions List – SC/15029 – 14 September 2022 On 14 September 2022, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) enacted the amendments, specified with strikethrough and/or underline, in the entries below on its Sanctions List of individuals and entities. Entities and other groups KPe.036 Name: SINGWANG ECONOMICS AND TRADING GENERAL CORPORATION A.k.a.: na F.k.a.: na Address: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Listed on: 30 Nov. 2016 (amended on 26 Jul. 2022, 14 Sep. 2022) Other information: Singwang Economics and Trading General Corporation is a DPRK firm for trading in coal. DPRK generates a significant share of the money for its nuclear and ballistic missile programs by mining natural resources and selling those resources abroad. IMO number: 5905801. KPe.074 Name: WEIHAI WORLD-SHIPPING FREIGHT A.k.a.: na F.k.a.: na Address: 419-201, Tongyi Lu, Huancui Qu, Weihai, Shandong, 264200, China Listed on: 30 Mar. 2018 (amended on 23 May 2018, 14 Sep. 2022) Other information: Ship and commercial manager of the XIN GUANG HAI, a vessel that on loaded coal at Taean, DPRK, on 27 October 2017 and had an ETA of 14 November 2017 to Cam Pha, Vietnam, but it did not arrive. IMO number: 5905801. Press releases concerning changes to the Committee’s Sanctions List may be found in the “Press Releases” section on the Committee’s website at the following URL: www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/press-releases. The updated version of the Committee’s Sanctions List, available in HTML, PDF and XML format, may be found at the following URL: www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/materials. The United Nations Security Council Consolidated List is also updated following all changes made to the Committee’s Sanctions List and is accessible at the following URL: www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/un-sc-consolidated-list. Listën e përditësuar të OKB e gjeni në adresat e mëposhtme si dhe në modulin e raportimit të DPPPP. Listën e përditësuar, të plotë, të përcaktuar sipas individëve, subjekteve, vendeve dhe rezolutave bazë, e gjeni në: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/un-sc-consolidated-list (Lista e Konsoliduar e OKB për personal dhe subjektet e shpallura Terrorist); https://www.un.org/press/en/content/security-council/press-release (Lista e Konsoliduar e OKB për personal dhe subjektet e shpallura Terrorist në faqen web të DPPPP https://fiu.gov.al/sq/ ... Më shumë ...
- Trajnim me subjektet e legjislacionit për parandalimin e pastrimit të paraveNë datën 23.09.2022 , u zhvillua, në ambientet e Drejtorisë së Përgjithshme të Parandalimit të Pastrimit të Parave (DPPPP) trajnimi me temë: “Mbi zbatimin e legjislacionit për parandalimin e pastrimit të parave, financimit të terrorizmit dhe sanksionet ndërkombëtare”, në të cilin merrnin pjesë përfaqësues të subjekteve shoqëri ndërtimi, Shoqëri Kursim Krediti dhe sigurim jete. Gjatë kësaj seance trajnimi, janë trajtuar nga ekspertët e DPPPP, çështjet që kanë të bëjnë me detyrimet për raportim që subjektet kanë në përputhje me ligjin nr.9917/2008 “Për parandalimin e pastrimit të parave dhe financimit të terrorizmit” i ndryshuar; qasja e bazuar mbi rrezikun e pastrimit të parave; faktorët e rrezikut dhe masat e kontrollit që duhet të ndërmerren nga subjektet; pritshmëria e autoriteteve mbikëqyrëse; vlerësimi i riskut të klienteve, produkteve, shërbimeve dhe mënyrës së ofrimit të tyre; modelet e vlerësimit të riskut dhe disa tipologji të pastrimit të parave, të cilat lidhen me fushën e aktivitetit të tyre; aspektet e zbatimit nga subjektet e ligjit të sanksioneve ndërkombëtare, të bazuara në rezolutat e Këshillit të Sigurimit për personat e shpallur si financues të terrorizmit, detyrimet ligjore të përcaktuara në ligjet nr.157/2013 “Për masat kundër financimit të terrorizmit” i ndryshuar, ligjit 72/2019 “Për masat shtrënguese ndërkombëtare”. Gjatë këtij trajnimi, ekspertët e DPPPP, gjithashtu ju përgjigjën dhe pyetjeve konkrete të pjesëmarrësve, për kategorizimin e riskut të klientëve dhe vlerësimin individual të riskut PP/FT nga ana e subjekteve.... Më shumë ...
- Trajnim me subjektet e legjislacionit për parandalimin e pastrimit të paraveNë datën 02.09.2022, u zhvillua, në ambientet e Drejtorisë së Përgjithshme të Parandalimit të Pastrimit të Parave (DPPPP) trajnimi me temë: “Mbi zbatimin e legjislacionit për parandalimin e pastrimit të parave”, në të cilin merrnin pjesë përfaqësues të Zyrave të Këmbimit Valutor dhe studiove ligjore. Gjatë kësaj seance trajnimi, janë trajtuar nga ekspertët e DPPPP, çështjet që kanë të bëjnë me detyrimet për raportim që subjektet kanë në përputhje me ligjin nr.9917/2008 “Për parandalimin e pastrimit të parave dhe financimit të terrorizmit” i ndryshuar; qasja e bazuar mbi rrezikun e pastrimit të parave; faktorët e rrezikut dhe masat e kontrollit që duhet të ndërmerren nga subjektet; pritshmëria e autoriteteve mbikëqyrëse; vlerësimi i riskut të klienteve, produkteve, shërbimeve dhe mënyrës së ofrimit të tyre; modelet e vlerësimit të riskut dhe disa tipologji të pastrimit të parave të cilat lidhen me fushën e aktivitetit të tyre; aspektet e zbatimit nga subjektet e ligjit të sanksioneve ndërkombëtare, të bazuara në rezolutat e Këshillit të Sigurimit për personat e shpallur si financues të terrorizmit, detyrimet ligjore të përcaktuara në ligjet nr.157/2013 “Për masat kundër financimit të terrorizmit” i ndryshuar, ligjit 72/2019 “Për masat shtrënguese ndërkombëtare”. Gjatë këtij trajnimi, ekspertët e DPPPP, gjithashtu ju përgjigjën dhe pyetjeve konkrete të pjesëmarrësve, për kategorizimin e riskut të klientëve dhe vlerësimin individual të riskut PP/FT nga ana e subjekteve.... Më shumë ...
- Trajnim me subjektet e legjislacionit për parandalimin e pastrimit të paraveNë datën 01.07.2022, u zhvillua, në ambientet e Drejtorisë së Përgjithshme të Parandalimit të Pastrimit të Parave (DPPPP) trajnimi me temë: “Mbi zbatimin e legjislacionit për parandalimin e pastrimit të parave”, në të cilin merrnin pjesë subjekte noter, shoqëri ndërtimi dhe përmbarues privat. Gjatë kësaj seance trajnimi, janë trajtuar nga ekspertët e DPPPP, çështjet që kanë të bëjnë me detyrimet për raportim që subjektet kanë në përputhje me ligjin nr.9917/2008 “Për parandalimin e pastrimit të parave dhe financimit të terrorizmit” i ndryshuar; qasja e bazuar mbi rrezikun e pastrimit të parave; faktorët e rrezikut dhe masat e kontrollit që duhet të ndërmerren nga subjektet; pritshmëria e autoriteteve mbikëqyrëse; vlerësimi i riskut të klienteve, produkteve, shërbimeve dhe mënyrës së ofrimit të tyre; modelet e vlerësimit të riskut dhe disa tipologji të pastrimit të parave të cilat lidhen me fushën e aktivitetit të tyre; aspektet e zbatimit nga subjektet e ligjit të sanksioneve ndërkombëtare, të bazuara në rezolutat e Këshillit të Sigurimit për personat e shpallur si financues të terrorizmit, detyrimet ligjore të përcaktuara në ligjet nr.157/2013 “Për masat kundër financimit të terrorizmit” i ndryshuar, ligjit 72/2019 “Për masat shtrënguese ndërkombëtare”. Gjatë këtij trajnimi, ekspertët e DPPPP, gjithashtu ju përgjigjën dhe pyetjeve konkrete të pjesëmarrësve, për kategorizimin e riskut të klientëve dhe vlerësimin individual të riskut PP/FT nga ana e subjekteve.... Më shumë ...
- Njoftimi i Këshillit të Sigurimit të Kombeve të Bashkuara 04.07.2022 – SC/14957 30 JUNE 2022 (Azhurnim)Security Council 1718 Sanctions Committee Amends One Entry on Its Sanctions List (SC/14957 30 JUNE 2022)-(AZHURNIM) On 30 June 2022, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) enacted the amendments, specified with strikethrough and/or underline, in the entry below on its Sanctions List of individuals and entities. A. Individual KPi.029 Name: 1: PAK 2: CHUN 3: IL 4: na Title: na Designation: Served as DPRK Ambassador to Egypt DOB: 28 Jul. 1954 POB: na Good quality a.k.a.: na Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Passport no: 563410091 National identification no: na Address: na Listed on: 30 Nov. 2016 (amended on 30 Jun. 2022) Other information: Pak Chun Il has served as the DPRK Ambassador to Egypt and provides support to KOMID. He concluded his tour of duty and left Egypt on 15 November 2016. Press releases concerning changes to the Committee’s Sanctions List may be found in the “Press Releases” section on the Committee’s website at the following URL: www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/press-releases. The updated version of the Committee’s Sanctions List, available in HTML, PDF and XML format, may be found at the following URL: www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/materials. The United Nations Security Council Consolidated List is also updated following all changes made to the Committee’s Sanctions List and is accessible at the following URL: www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/un-sc-consolidated-list.... Më shumë ...
- Deklarata e FATF për vendet me riskNë datat 14 – 17 Qershor 2022 u mbajt në Paris mbledhja plenare e Grupit të Posaçëm të Veprimit Financiar (FATF), në të cilin e mor në shqyrtim lista e vendeve në monitorim për çështjet e pastrimit të parave dhe financimit të terrorizmit. Në vijim paraqitet lista e detajuar e këtyre vendeve e ndarë në rubrikat përkatëse: Vëndet me risk të lartë (e pandryshuar që prej muajit Shkurt 2020); Vëndet nën monitorim të shtuar; High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action – 21 February 2020 High-risk jurisdictions have significant strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and financing of proliferation. For all countries identified as high-risk, the FATF calls on all members and urges all jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence, and in the most serious cases, countries are called upon to apply counter-measures to protect the international financial system from the ongoing money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing (ML/TF/PF) risks emanating from the country. This list is often externally referred to as the “black list”. * Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) The FATF remains concerned by the DPRK’s failure to address the significant deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime and the serious threats they pose to the integrity of the international financial system. The FATF urges the DPRK to immediately and meaningfully address its AML/CFT deficiencies. Further, the FATF has serious concerns with the threat posed by the DPRK’s illicit activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and its financing. The FATF reaffirms its 25 February 2011 call on its members and urges all jurisdictions to advise their financial institutions to give special attention to business relationships and transactions with the DPRK, including DPRK companies, financial institutions, and those acting on their behalf. In addition to enhanced scrutiny, the FATF further calls on its members and urges all jurisdictions to apply effective counter-measures, and targeted financial sanctions in accordance with applicable United Nations Security Council Resolutions, to protect their financial sectors from money laundering, financing of terrorism and WMD proliferation financing (ML/TF/PF) risks emanating from the DPRK. Jurisdictions should take necessary measures to close existing branches, subsidiaries and representative offices of DPRK banks within their territories and terminate correspondent relationships with DPRK banks, where required by relevant UNSC resolutions. Iran In June 2016, Iran committed to address its strategic deficiencies. Iran’s action plan expired in January 2018. In February 2020, the FATF noted Iran has not completed the action plan. In October 2019, the FATF called upon its members and urged all jurisdictions to: require increased supervisory examination for branches and subsidiaries of financial institutions based in Iran; introduce enhanced relevant reporting mechanisms or systematic reporting of financial transactions; and require increased external audit requirements for financial groups with respect to any of their branches and subsidiaries located in Iran. Now, given Iran’s failure to enact the Palermo and Terrorist Financing Conventions in line with the FATF Standards, the FATF fully lifts the suspension of counter-measures and calls on its members and urges all jurisdictions to apply effective counter-measures, in line with Recommendation 19. Iran will remain on the FATF statement on until the full Action Plan has been completed. If Iran ratifies the Palermo and Terrorist Financing Conventions, in line with the FATF standards, the FATF will decide on next steps, including whether to suspend countermeasures. Until Iran implements the measures required to address the deficiencies identified with respect to countering terrorism-financing in the Action Plan, the FATF will remain concerned with the terrorist financing risk emanating from Iran and the threat this poses to the international financial system. In June 2016, the FATF welcomed Iran’s high-level political commitment to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, and its decision to seek technical assistance in the implementation of the Action Plan. Since 2016, Iran established a cash declaration regime, enacted amendments to its Counter-Terrorist Financing Act and its Anti-Money Laundering Act, and adopted an AML by-law. In February 2020, the FATF noted that there are still items not completed and Iran should fully address: (1) adequately criminalizing terrorist financing, including by removing the exemption for designated groups “attempting to end foreign occupation, colonialism and racism”; (2) identifying and freezing terrorist assets in line with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions; (3) ensuring an adequate and enforceable customer due diligence regime; (4) demonstrating how authorities are identifying and sanctioning unlicensed money/value transfer service providers; (5) ratifying and implementing the Palermo and TF Conventions and clarifying the capability to provide mutual legal assistance; and (6) ensuring that financial institutions verify that wire transfers contain complete originator and beneficiary information. Countries should be able to apply appropriate countermeasures when called upon to do so by the FATF. Countries should also be able to apply countermeasures independently of any call by the FATF to do so. Such countermeasures should be effective and proportionate to the risks. The Interpretative Note to Recommendation 19 specifies examples of the countermeasures that could be undertaken by countries. Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring – June 2022 Berlin, 17 June 2022 – Jurisdictions under increased monitoring are actively working with the FATF to address strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing. When the FATF places a jurisdiction under increased monitoring, it means the country has committed to resolve swiftly the identified strategic deficiencies within agreed timeframes and is subject to increased monitoring. This list is often externally referred to as the “grey list”. The FATF and FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) continue to work with the jurisdictions below as they report on the progress achieved in addressing their strategic deficiencies. The FATF calls on these jurisdictions to complete their action plans expeditiously and within the agreed timeframes. The FATF welcomes their commitment and will closely monitor their progress. The FATF does not call for the application of enhanced due diligence measures to be applied to these jurisdictions, but encourages its members and all jurisdictions to take into account the information presented below in their risk analysis. The FATF identifies additional jurisdictions, on an on-going basis, that have strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing. A number of jurisdictions have not yet been reviewed by the FATF or their FSRBs, but will be in due course. Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, the FATF has provided some flexibility to jurisdictions not facing immediate deadlines to report progress on a voluntary basis. The following countries had their progress reviewed by the FATF since March 2022: Albania, Barbados, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cayman Islands, Haiti, Jamaica, Jordan, Mali, Malta, Morocco, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Senegal, South Sudan, Türkiye, and Uganda. For these countries, updated statements are provided below. The United Arab Emirates chose to defer reporting to focus on its efforts; thus, the statement issued in March 2022 for that jurisdiction is included below, but it may not necessarily reflect the most recent status of the jurisdiction’s AML/CFT regime. Following review, the FATF now also identifies Gibraltar. The FATF welcomes the progress made by these countries in combating money laundering and terrorist financing, despite the challenges posed by COVID-19. Jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies Jurisdiction no longer subject to increased monitoring Albania Barbados Burkina Faso Cambodia Cayman Islands Gibraltar Haiti Jamaica Jordan Mali Morocco Myanmar Nicaragua Pakistan Panama Philippines Senegal South Sudan Syria Türkiye Uganda United Arab Emirates Yemen Malta Albania Since February 2020, when Albania made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MONEYVAL to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Albania has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by enhancing the focus and efforts of law enforcement and prosecutorial authorities on applying the full range of seizure and confiscation measures, particularly in connection with assets linked to third-party money laundering by professionals and gatekeepers. Albania should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) ensuring an adequate legal framework for violations of company and NPO registration obligations and implementing proportionate and dissuasive sanctions; and (2) increasing the number of prosecutions for ML, especially in cases involving foreign predicate offences. The FATF urges Albania to continue to implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies as soon as possible as all deadlines have now expired. Barbados Since February 2020, when Barbados made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Barbados has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by establishing and resourcing a new compliance unit under its AML Authority responsible for DNFBP supervision; demonstrating that authorities have access to the BO information regarding legal arrangements; and reducing the backlog of criminal cases, including ML prosecutions. Barbados should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) taking appropriate measures to prevent legal persons and arrangements from being misused for criminal purposes, and ensuring that accurate and up-to-date basic and beneficial ownership information is available on a timely basis; (2) ensuring its FIU’s financial intelligence products further assist law enforcement authorities in investigating ML or TF; (3) demonstrating that ML investigations and prosecutions are in line with the country’s risk profile and result in sanctions, when appropriate, and provide statistics or case studies demonstrating a reduction of any backlog of cases; (4) further pursuing confiscation in ML cases, including by seeking assistance from foreign counterparts. The FATF encourages Barbados to continue to implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies as soon as possible as all deadlines have now expired. Burkina Faso Since February 2021, when Burkina Faso made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Burkina Faso has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by conducting targeted financial sanctions (TFS) awareness-raising programmes for competent authorities and reporting entities. Burkina Faso should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) updating its understanding of ML/TF risks, including through the revision of the national risk assessment in line with the sectoral priorities identified in its national strategy; (2) seeking mutual legal assistance (MLA) and other forms of international cooperation in line with its risk profile; (3) strengthening of resource capacities of all AML/CFT supervisory authorities and implementing risk based supervision of FIs and DNFBPs; (4) maintaining comprehensive and updated basic and beneficial ownership information and strengthening the system of sanctions for violations of transparency obligations; (5) increasing the diversity of STR reporting; (6) enhancing the FIU’s human resources through additional, hiring, training and budget; (7) conduct training for LEAs, prosecutors and other relevant authorities; (8) demonstrating that authorities are pursuing confiscation as a policy objective; (9) enhancing capacity and support for LEAs and prosecutorial authorities involved in combatting TF, in line with the TF National Strategy; and (10) implementing an effective targeted financial sanctions regime related to TF and PF as well as risk-based monitoring and supervision of NPOs. Cambodia Since February 2019, when Cambodia made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Cambodia has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by improving the quality and quantity of FIU disseminations, demonstrating an increase in ML investigations in line with risk and providing training to strengthen the skills of competent authorities to implement TFS for PF. Cambodia should continue to take action to fully address the one remaining item in its action plan as all timelines have already expired, specifically by: demonstrating an increase in the freezing and confiscation of criminal proceeds, instrumentalities, and property of equivalent value. The FATF again expresses significant concern that Cambodia failed to complete its action plan, which fully expired in January 2021. The FATF strongly urges Cambodia to swiftly complete its action plan by October 2022 or the FATF will consider calling on its members and urging all jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence to business relations and transactions with Cambodia. The Cayman Islands In February 2021, the Cayman Islands made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. The Cayman Islands should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) imposing adequate and effective sanctions in cases where relevant parties (including legal persons) do not file accurate, adequate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information in line with those requirements; and (2) demonstrating that they are prosecuting all types of money laundering cases in line with the jurisdiction’s risk profile and that such prosecutions are resulting in the application of dissuasive, effective, and proportionate sanctions. The FATF encourages the Cayman Islands to continue to implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies as soon as possible as all deadlines have now expired. Gibraltar In June 2022, Gibraltar made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MONEYVAL to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in December 2019, Gibraltar has made progress on a significant number of its MER’s recommended actions, such as completing a new national risk assessment, addressing the technical deficiencies in relation to BO-related record keeping, introducing transparency requirements for nominee shareholders and directors, strengthening the financial intelligence unit, and refining its ML investigation policy in line with risks. Gibraltar should work on implementing its action plan, including by: (1) ensuring that supervisory authorities for non-bank financial institutions and DNFBPs use a range of effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions for AML/CFT breaches; and (2) demonstrating that it is more actively and successfully pursuing final confiscation judgements, through criminal or civil proceedings based on financial investigations. Haiti In June 2021, Haiti made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Haiti should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) completing its ML/TF risk assessment process and disseminating the findings; (2) facilitating information sharing with relevant foreign counterparts; (3) addressing the technical deficiencies in its legal and regulatory framework that impede the implementation of AML/CFT preventive measures and implementing risk-based AML/CFT supervision for all financial institutions and DNFBPs deemed to constitute a higher ML/TF risk; (4) ensuring basic and beneficial ownership information are maintained and accessible in a timely manner; (5) ensuring a better use of financial intelligence and other relevant information by competent authorities for combatting ML and TF; (6) addressing the technical deficiencies in its ML offence and demonstrating authorities are identifying, investigating and prosecuting ML cases in a manner consistent with Haiti’s risk profile; (7) demonstrating an increase of identification, tracing and recovery of proceeds of crime; (8) addressing the technical deficiencies in its TF offence and targeted financial sanctions regime; and (9) conducting appropriate risk-based monitoring of NPOs vulnerable to TF abuse without disrupting or discouraging legitimate NPO activities. Jamaica Since February 2020, when Jamaica made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Jamaica has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by increasing investigative resources; training prosecutorial and law enforcement authorities; and improving the domestic coordination between these authorities. Jamaica should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) including all FIs and DNFBPs in the AML/CFT regime and ensuring adequate, risk-based supervision in all sectors; (2) taking appropriate measures to prevent legal persons and arrangements from being misused for criminal purposes, and ensuring that accurate and up-to-date basic and beneficial ownership information is available on a timely basis to competent authorities; and (3) implementing a risk-based approach for supervision of the NPO sector to prevent abuse for TF purposes. The FATF urges Jamaica to continue to implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies as soon as possible as all deadlines have now expired. Jordan Since October 2021, when Jordan made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Jordan has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by rectifying its legal framework for TF TFS and demonstrating an effective process by the national committee and supervisory authorities to implement TFS without delay. Jordan should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) disseminating the risk assessments of NPOs, and completing and disseminating the ML/TF risk assessments of legal persons and virtual assets; (2) improving risk based supervision and applying effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions for noncompliance; (3) conducting training and awareness raising programmes for DNFBPs on their AML/CFT obligations, particularly with regard to filing and submitting STRs; (4) maintaining comprehensive and updated basic and beneficial ownership information on legal persons and legal arrangements; (5) pursuing money laundering investigations and prosecutions, including through parallel financial investigations, for predicate offences in line with the risk identified in the NRA; (6) creating a legal obligation for confiscating instrumentalities used or intended to be used in ML crimes; (7) monitoring and effectively supervising the compliance of FIs and DNFBPs with TFS obligations; and (8) developing and implementing a risk-based approach for supervision of the NPO sector to prevent abuse for TF purposes. Mali In October 2021, Mali made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Mali should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) disseminating the results of the NRA to all relevant stakeholders including by conducting awareness raising activities for the highest risk sectors; (2) developing and starting to implement a risk based approach for the AML/CFT supervision of all FIs and higher risk DNFBPs and demonstrating effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for noncompliance; (3) conducting a comprehensive assessment of ML/TF risks associated with all types of legal persons; (4) increasing the capacity of the FIU and the LEAs and enhancing their cooperation on the use of financial intelligence; (5) ensuring relevant competent authorities are involved in investigation and prosecution of ML; (6) strengthening the capacities of relevant authorities responsible for investigation and prosecution of TF cases; (7) establishing a legal framework and procedures to implement TFS related to TF and PF; and (8) implementing a risk-based approach for supervision of the NPO sector to prevent abuse for TF purposes. Morocco Since February 2021, when Morocco made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Morocco has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by licensing and monitoring the registration of DNFBPs and addressing technical deficiencies related to TFS. Morocco should continue to work to implement its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) improving risk-based supervision and taking remedial actions and applying effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for non-compliance; (2) undertake and share the results of the risk assessment on the misuse of all types of legal persons with the private sector and competent authorities; (3) increasing the diversity of suspicious transactions reporting; (4) establishing asset seizing and confiscation procedures; and (5) monitoring and effectively supervising the compliance of FIs and DNFBPs with targeted financial sanctions obligations. Myanmar In February 2020, Myanmar made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and address any related technical deficiencies. Myanmar should work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) demonstrating an improved understanding of ML risks in key areas; (2) demonstrating that onsite/offsite inspections are risk-based, and hundi operators are registered and supervised; (3) demonstrating enhanced use of financial intelligence in LEA investigations, and increasing operational analysis and disseminations by the FIU; (4) ensuring that ML is investigated/prosecuted in line with risks; (5) demonstrating investigation of transnational ML cases with international cooperation; (6) demonstrating an increase in the freezing/seizing and confiscation of criminal proceeds, instrumentalities, and/or property of equivalent value; (7) managing seized assets to preserve the value of seized goods until confiscation; and (8) demonstrating implementation of targeted financial sanctions related to PF. The FATF again expresses significant concern with Myanmar’s lack of progress with all deadlines having expired, and significant work remaining on the majority of its action plan including fundamental deficiencies that need to be addressed with respect to ML investigations, prosecutions and asset confiscation. The FATF again strongly urges Myanmar to swiftly complete its action plan by October 2022 or the FATF will consider calling on its members and urging all jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence to business relations and transactions with Myanmar. Nicaragua In February 2020, Nicaragua made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GAFILAT to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Nicaragua has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime specific to its FATF action plan, including by updating its national risk assessment on ML/TF and disseminating the outcomes of its ML/TF risk understanding to competent authorities and relevant private sector entities and putting in place mechanisms to ensure that beneficial ownership information of legal persons and arrangements is maintained and obtained in a timely manner. At its June 2022 Plenary, the FATF made the initial determination that Nicaragua has substantially completed its action plan and warrants an on-site visit to verify that the implementation of Nicaragua’s AML/CFT reforms has begun and is being sustained, and that the necessary political commitment remains in place to sustain implementation and improvement in the future. The FATF will continue to monitor the COVID-19 situation and conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date. Pakistan Since June 2018, when Pakistan made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen its AML/CFT regime and to address its strategic counter terrorist financing-related deficiencies, Pakistan’s continued political commitment to combating both terrorist financing and money laundering has led to significant progress. In particular, Pakistan demonstrated that TF investigations and prosecutions target senior leaders and commanders of UN designated terrorist groups and that there is a positive upwards trend in the number of ML investigations and prosecutions being pursued in Pakistan, in line with Pakistan’s risk profile. In addition, Pakistan also largely addressed its 2021 action plan ahead of the set times. At its June 2022 Plenary, the FATF made the initial determination that Pakistan has substantially completed its two action plans, covering 34 items, and warrants an on-site visit to verify that the implementation of Pakistan’s AML/CFT reforms has begun and is being sustained, and that the necessary political commitment remains in place to sustain implementation and improvement in the future. The FATF will continue to monitor the COVID-19 situation and conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date. Panama Since June 2019, when Panama made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GAFILAT to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Panama has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by improving the monitoring of the corporate sector, and focusing on ML investigations in relation to high-risk areas, particularly ML investigations involving foreign predicates and the seizing and confiscation of proceeds of crime. However, Panama should continue to take urgent action to fully address remaining measures in its action plan as all timelines have already expired in January 2021. Panama should therefore continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) ensuring effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions in response to AML/CFT violations; (2) ensuring adequate verification, of up-to-date beneficial ownership information by obliged entities and timely access by competent authorities, establishing effective mechanisms to monitor the activities of offshore entities, to consider the risks of misuse of legal persons and arrangements to define and implement specific measures to prevent the misuse of nominee shareholders and directors; and (3) demonstrating its ability to investigate and prosecute ML involving foreign tax crimes. The FATF again expresses significant concern that Panama failed to complete its action plan, which fully expired in January 2021. The FATF strongly urges Panama to swiftly complete its action plan by October 2022 or the FATF will consider calling on its members and urging all jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence to business relations and transactions with Panama. Philippines Since June 2021, when the Philippines made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, the Philippines has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by implementing registration requirements and applying proportionate and dissuasive sanctions to unregistered and illegal remittance operators and increasing TF investigation and prosecution capacity. The Philippines should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) demonstrating that effective risk-based supervision of DNFBPs is occurring; (2) demonstrating that supervisors are using AML/CFT controls to mitigate risks associated with casino junkets; (3) enhancing and streamlining LEA access to BO information and taking steps to ensure that BO information is accurate and up-to-date; (4) demonstrating an increase in the use of financial intelligence and an increase in ML investigations and prosecutions in line with risk; (5) demonstrating an increase in the identification, investigation and prosecution of TF cases; (6) demonstrating that appropriate measures are taken with respect to the NPO sector (including unregistered NPOs) without disrupting legitimate NPO activity; and (7) enhancing the effectiveness of the targeted financial sanctions framework for both TF and PF. Senegal Since February 2021, when Senegal made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Senegal has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by establishing and implementing a risk-based AML/CFT monitoring system, and continuing to enhance the FIU’s resources to ensure effective operational analysis. Senegal should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) ensuring consistent understanding of ML/TF risks (in particular related to the DNFBP sector) across relevant authorities through training and outreach; (2) seeking MLA and other forms of international cooperation in line with its risk profile; (3) improving compliance by detecting AML/CFT violations and imposing effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions against non-compliant entities; (4) updating and maintaining comprehensive beneficial ownership information on legal persons and arrangements and strengthening the system of sanctions for violations of transparency obligations; (5) demonstrating that efforts aimed at strengthening detection mechanisms and reinforcing the capability to conduct ML/predicate offences investigations and prosecutions activities are sustained consistently in line with the Senegal’s risk profile; (6) establishing comprehensive and standardised policies and procedures for identifying, tracing, seizing and confiscating proceeds and instrumentalities of crime in line with its risk profile; (7) strengthening the authorities understanding of TF risks and enhancing capacity and support for LEAs and prosecutorial authorities involved in TF in line with the 2019 TF National Strategy; and (8) implementing an effective TFS regime related to TF and PF as well as risk-based monitoring and supervision of NPOs. South Sudan In June 2021, South Sudan made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. South Sudan will work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) engaging with ESAAMLG for membership and committing to undergo a mutual evaluation by ESAAMLG; (2) conducting a comprehensive review of the AML/CFT Act (2012), with the support of international partners, including technical assistance, to comply with the FATF Standards; (3) becoming a party to and fully implementing the 1988 Vienna Convention, the 2000 Palermo Convention, and the 1999 Terrorist Financing Convention; (4) ensuring that competent authorities are suitably structured and capacitated to implement a risk-based approach to AML/CFT supervision for financial institutions; (5) developing a comprehensive legal framework to collect and verify the accuracy of beneficial ownership information for legal persons; (6) operationalising a fully functioning and independent FIU; (7) establishing and implementing the legal and institutional framework to implement targeted financial sanctions in compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions on terrorism and WMD proliferation financing; and (8) commencing implementation of targeted risk-based supervision/monitoring of NPOs at risk of TF abuse. The FATF notes South Sudan’s limited progress across its action plan. The FATF encourages South Sudan to continue to demonstrate its strong political and institutional commitment to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, particularly in supporting the lead AML/CFT agency in coordinating national AML/CFT efforts and seeking full ESAAMLG membership. Syria Since February 2010, when Syria made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Syria has made progress to improve its AML/CFT regime. In June 2014, the FATF determined that Syria had substantially addressed its action plan at a technical level, including by criminalising terrorist financing and establishing procedures for freezing terrorist assets. While the FATF determined that Syria has completed its agreed action plan, due to the security situation, the FATF has been unable to conduct an on-site visit to confirm whether the process of implementing the required reforms and actions has begun and is being sustained. The FATF will continue to monitor the situation, and will conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date. Türkiye Since October 2021, when Türkiye made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Türkiye has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by increasing the human resources at the FIU to conduct analysis and conducting some outreach to the NPO sector about their risks and vulnerabilities to terrorist financing activity. Türkiye should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) dedicating more resources at the FIU to supervision of AML/CFT compliance by high-risk sectors and increasing on-site inspections overall; (2) applying dissuasive sanctions for AML/CFT breaches, in particular for unregistered money transfer services and exchange offices and in relation to the requirements of adequate, accurate, and up-to-date beneficial ownership information; (3) enhancing the use of financial intelligence to support ML investigations and increasing proactive disseminations by the FIU; (4) undertaking more complex money laundering investigations and prosecutions; (5) setting out clear responsibilities and measurable performance objectives and metrics for the authorities responsible for recovering criminal assets and pursuing terrorism financing cases and using statistics to update risk assessments and inform policy; (6) conducting more financial investigations in terrorism cases, prioritising TF investigations and prosecutions related to UN-designated groups and ensuring TF investigations are extended to identify financing and support networks; (7) concerning targeted financial sanctions under UNSCRs 1373 and 1267, pursuing outgoing requests and domestic designations related to UN-designated groups, in line with Türkiye’s risk profile; (8) to fully implement a risk-based approach to supervision of non-profit organisations to prevent their abuse for terrorist financing, conducting outreach to a broad range of NPOs in the sector and engaging with their feedback, ensuring that sanctions applied are proportionate to any violations, and taking steps to ensure that supervision does not disrupt or discourage legitimate NPO activity, such as fundraising. The FATF continues to monitor Türkiye’s oversight of the NPO sector. Türkiye is urged to demonstrate the implementation of the risk-based approach to supervision of NPOs in line with the FATF Standards. Uganda Since February 2020, when Uganda made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Uganda demonstrated progress, including conducting TF investigations and prosecutions. Uganda should continue to work to implement its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) seeking international cooperation in line with the country’s risk profile; (2) developing and implementing risk-based supervision of FIs and DNFBPs; (3) ensuring that competent authorities have timely access to accurate basic and beneficial ownership information for legal entities; (4) demonstrating LEAs and judicial authorities apply the ML offence consistent with the identified risks; (5) establishing and implementing policies and procedures for identifying, tracing, seizing and confiscating proceeds and instrumentalities of crime; (6) addressing the technical deficiencies in the legal framework to implement PF-related targeted financial sanctions; and (7) implementing a risk-based approach for supervision of its NPO sector to prevent TF abuse. The FATF continues to monitor Uganda’s oversight of the NPO sector. Uganda is strongly urged to align the Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment for NPOs with the FATF Standards. This is needed to apply the risk-based approach to supervision of NPOs in line with the FATF Standards to mitigate unintended consequences. The FATF urges the authorities to swiftly implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies as soon as possible as all deadlines have now expired. The United Arab Emirates (Statement from March 2022) In February 2022, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in February 2020, the UAE has made significant progress across its MER’s recommended actions to improve its system, including by finalising a TF Risk Assessment, creating an AML/CFT coordination committee, establishing an effective system to implement targeted financial sanctions without delay, and significantly improving its ability to confiscate criminal proceeds and engage in international cooperation. Additionally, the UAE addressed or largely addressed more than half of the key recommended actions from the MER. The UAE will work to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) demonstrating through case studies and statistics a sustained increase in outbound MLA requests to help facilitate investigation of TF, ML, and high-risk predicates; (2) identifying and maintaining a shared understanding of the ML/TF risks between the different DNFBP sectors and institutions; (3) showing an increase in the number and quality of STRs filed by FIs and DNFBPs; (4) achieving a more granular understanding of the risk of abuse of legal persons and, where applicable, legal arrangements, for ML/TF; (5) providing additional resources to the FIU to strengthen its analysis function and enhance the use of financial intelligence to pursue high-risk ML threats, such as proceeds of foreign predicate offenses, trade-based ML, and third-party laundering; (6) demonstrating a sustained increase in effective investigations and prosecutions of different types of ML cases consistent with UAE’s risk profile; and (7) proactively identifying and combating sanctions evasion, including by using detailed TFS guidance in sustained awareness-raising with the private sector and demonstrating a better understanding of sanctions evasion among the private sector. Yemen Since February 2010, when Yemen made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Yemen has made progress to improve its AML/CFT regime. In June 2014, the FATF determined that Yemen had substantially addressed its action plan at a technical level, including by: (1) adequately criminalising money laundering and terrorist financing; (2) establishing procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets; (3) improving its customer due diligence and suspicious transaction reporting requirements; (4) issuing guidance; (5) developing the monitoring and supervisory capacity of the financial sector supervisory authorities and the financial intelligence unit; and (6) establishing a fully operational and effectively functioning financial intelligence unit. While the FATF determined that Yemen has completed its agreed action plan, due to the security situation, the FATF has been unable to conduct an on-site visit to confirm whether the process of implementing the required reforms and actions has begun and is being sustained. The FATF will continue to monitor the situation, and conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date. Jurisdiction No Longer Subject to Increased Monitoring by the FATF Malta The FATF welcomes Malta’s significant progress in improving its AML/CFT regime. Malta has strengthened the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime to meet the commitments in its action plan regarding the strategic deficiencies that the FATF identified in June 2021 related to the detection of inaccurate company ownership information and sanctions on gatekeepers who fail to obtain accurate beneficial ownership information, as well as the pursuit of tax-based money laundering cases utilising financial intelligence. Malta is therefore no longer subject to the FATF’s increased monitoring process. Malta should continue to work with MONEYVAL to sustain its improvements in its AML/CFT system. ... Më shumë ...
- Trajnim me subjektet e legjislacionit për parandalimin e pastrimit të paraveNë datën 17.06.2022, u zhvillua, në ambientet e Drejtorisë së Përgjithshme të Parandalimit të Pastrimit të Parave (DPPPP) trajnimi me temë: “Mbi zbatimin e legjislacionit për parandalimin e pastrimit të parave”, në të cilin merrnin pjesë subjekte noter dhe avokat. Gjatë kësaj seance trajnimi, janë trajtuar nga ekspertët e DPPPP, çështjet që kanë të bëjnë me detyrimet për raportim që subjektet kanë në përputhje me ligjin nr.9917/2008 “Për parandalimin e pastrimit të parave dhe financimit të terrorizmit” i ndryshuar; qasja e bazuar mbi rrezikun e pastrimit të parave; faktorët e rrezikut dhe masat e kontrollit që duhet të ndërmerren nga subjektet; pritshmëria e autoriteteve mbikëqyrëse; vlerësimi i riskut të klienteve, produkteve, shërbimeve dhe mënyrës së ofrimit të tyre; modelet e vlerësimit të riskut dhe disa tipologji të pastrimit të parave të cilat lidhen me fushën e aktivitetit të tyre; aspektet e zbatimit nga subjektet e ligjit të sanksioneve ndërkombëtare, të bazuara në rezolutat e Këshillit të Sigurimit për personat e shpallur si financues të terrorizmit, detyrimet ligjore të përcaktuara në ligjet nr.157/2013 “Për masat kundër financimit të terrorizmit” i ndryshuar, ligjit 72/2019 “Për masat shtrënguese ndërkombëtare”. Gjatë këtij trajnimi, ekspertët e DPPPP, gjithashtu ju përgjigjën dhe pyetjeve konkrete të pjesëmarrësve, për kategorizimin e riskut të klientëve dhe vlerësimin individual të riskut PP/FT nga ana e subjekteve.... Më shumë ...
- Trajnim me subjektet e legjislacionit për parandalimin e pastrimit të paraveNë datën 03.06.2022, u zhvillua, në ambientet e Drejtorisë së Përgjithshme të Parandalimit të Pastrimit të Parave (DPPPP) trajnimi me temë: “Mbi zbatimin e legjislacionit për parandalimin e pastrimit të parave”, në të cilin merrnin pjesë përfaqësues të Zyrave të Këmbimit Valutor, Institucion Financiar Jo-Bankë dhe Zyrë Përmbarimi Privat. Gjatë kësaj seance trajnimi, janë trajtuar nga ekspertët e DPPPP, çështjet që kanë të bëjnë me detyrimet për raportim që subjektet kanë në përputhje me ligjin nr.9917/2008 “Për parandalimin e pastrimit të parave dhe financimit të terrorizmit” i ndryshuar; qasja e bazuar mbi rrezikun e pastrimit të parave; faktorët e rrezikut dhe masat e kontrollit që duhet të ndërmerren nga subjektet; pritshmëria e autoriteteve mbikëqyrëse; vlerësimi i riskut të klienteve, produkteve, shërbimeve dhe mënyrës së ofrimit të tyre; modelet e vlerësimit të riskut dhe disa tipologji të pastrimit të parave të cilat lidhen me fushën e aktivitetit të tyre; aspektet e zbatimit nga subjektet e ligjit të sanksioneve ndërkombëtare, të bazuara në rezolutat e Këshillit të Sigurimit për personat e shpallur si financues të terrorizmit, detyrimet ligjore të përcaktuara në ligjet nr.157/2013 “Për masat kundër financimit të terrorizmit” i ndryshuar, ligjit 72/2019 “Për masat shtrënguese ndërkombëtare”. Gjatë këtij trajnimi, ekspertët e DPPPP, gjithashtu ju përgjigjën dhe pyetjeve konkrete të pjesëmarrësve, për kategorizimin e riskut të klientëve dhe vlerësimin individual të riskut PP/FT nga ana e subjekteve.... Më shumë ...
- Njoftimi i Këshillit të Sigurimit të Kombeve të Bashkuara 24.05.2022 SC/14895 19 MAY 2022 (Heqje)Security Council 1518 Sanctions Committee Removes Three Entries from Its Sanctions List (SC/14895 19 MAY 2022)-(HEQJE) On 19 May 2022, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1518 (2003) removed the following entries from its Sanctions List of individuals and entities: A. Individuals IQi.072 Name: 1: KHALAF 2: M. 3: M. 4: AL-DULAYMI Name (original script): خلف م. م. الدليمي Title: na Designation: na DOB: 25 Jan. 1932 POB: na Good quality a.k.a.: Khalaf Al Dulaimi Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: Iraq Passport no: No. H0044232 (Iraqi) National identification no: na Address: na Listed on: 26 Apr. 2004 Other information: A. Entities and other groups IQe.201 Name: MIDCO FINANCIAL, S.A. A.k.a.: MIDCO FINANCE, S.A. F.k.a.: na Address: na Listed on: 26 Apr. 2004 Other information: Federal No. CH-660-0-469-982-0 (Switzerland) IQe.202 Name: MONTANA MANAGEMENT, INC. A.k.a.: na F.k.a.: na Address: Panama Listed on: 26 Apr. 2004 Other information: Press releases concerning changes to the Committee’s Sanctions List may be found in the “Press Releases” section on the Committee’s website at the following URL: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1518/press-releases. The updated version of the Committee’s Sanctions List, available in HTML, PDF and XML format, may be found at the following URL: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1518/materials. The United Nations Security Council Consolidated List is also updated following all changes made to the Committee’s Sanctions List and is accessible at the following URL: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/un-sc-consolidated-list.... Më shumë ...

- Trajnim me subjektet e legjislacionit për parandalimin e pastrimit të parave – 20.05.2022